

# Whither Propaganda? Agonism and “The Engineering of Consent”

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Randall L. Bytwerk, *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 228 pp. \$59.95 (cloth), \$24.95 (paper).

Gerd Horten, *Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda During World War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 232 pp. \$45.00 (cloth), \$24.95 (paper).

Christina S. Jarvis, *The Male Body at War: American Masculinity During World War II* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois Press, 2003), 266 pp. \$43.00 (cloth).

Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945–1955* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 264 pp. \$85.00 (cloth).

Propaganda is a soft weapon: hold it in your hands too long, and it will move about like a snake, and strike the other way.

Jean Anouilh<sup>1</sup>

Propaganda was apparently everywhere in 2004. Conservatives of all stripes could see it perhaps most clearly in Michael Moore’s popular documentary *Fahrenheit 9/11*. The film incensed many conservative commentators, who branded it “clever (if breathtakingly sleazy) political propaganda.”<sup>2</sup> In CBS News and “Rathergate,” conservatives seemed to find more propaganda on which to fixate. The *New York Post* contended that Dan Rather had “single-handedly removed the ‘C’ for ‘credibility’ in the CBS logo—and turned the country’s venerable broadcast propaganda machine forever into the network of BS.”<sup>3</sup> Even John Kerry became a propagandist in conservative eyes. The presidential candidate was attacked in the *Washington Times*, for instance, for his allegedly “communist propaganda that GIs

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were ‘war criminals’ through his anti-American testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”<sup>4</sup> In the conservative world view, 2004 was evidently a propaganda nightmare, complete with opprobrious messages and shadowy leftist propagandists.

Not to be outdone, liberals found propagandistic overtones in nearly every conservative utterance. Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ*, for example, used what some saw as “anti-Jewish stereotypes” worthy only of “Nazi propaganda.”<sup>5</sup> The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, a group organized to damage Kerry’s presidential run, was accused of producing “well-financed propaganda.”<sup>6</sup> Some of the strongest liberal condemnations, however, were reserved for the Bush campaign and its adherents’ attempts to counter Kerry’s war record. An independently-produced “TV spot slandering John Kerry’s Vietnam War service,” wrote the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, “is easily one of the smelliest pieces of propaganda that has ever fouled the American airwaves.”<sup>7</sup> With such superlatives, liberals joined conservatives in an old-fashioned shouting contest throughout 2004, each camp trying to outdo the other’s propaganda accusations.

These propaganda squabbles did not abate with the completion of the election cycle. With 2005 less than one month old, the Bush administration found itself embarrassed at allegations that it surreptitiously paid journalists, including media commentator Armstrong Williams and columnist Maggie Gallagher, to promote its policies. The ensuing propaganda taunts began almost immediately. The *St. Petersburg Times*, for example, editorialized against the apparent payments, calling them “covert, and possibly illegal, campaigns to spread propaganda in the press.”<sup>8</sup> The *Denver Post* agreed, writing that “this isn’t the first time the Bush administration has packaged propaganda as ‘news.’”<sup>9</sup> The *Oregonian* summarized that “legitimate public relations tools” for the White House should never include payments to journalists, which it called “tax-supported payola and propaganda.”<sup>10</sup>

Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Frank R. Lautenberg were so offended at the administration’s alleged activities that they announced intentions to introduce the so-called Stop Government Propaganda Act. The White House’s actions, said Kennedy in a prepared statement, were “more than just a mistake”—they were instead “an abuse of taxpayer funds and an abuse of the First Amendment and freedom of the press.”<sup>11</sup> Lautenberg was even more assertive, proclaiming that “it’s time for Congress to shut down the Administration’s propaganda mill.”<sup>12</sup>

In some respects, Kennedy and Lautenberg’s bill was just one more act in the ongoing morality play over allegations of propaganda. Yet the bill did diverge from 2004’s accusations in at least one significant way. Instead of simply flinging an unfocused charge at the other side of the aisle, the bill actually attempted to define the rhetoric it aimed to regulate. However, the bill’s definition of propaganda—focusing largely on executive messages “that do not clearly identify the government agency responsible for the content” or that are “so misleading or inaccurate that they constitute propaganda”<sup>13</sup>—was at once too specific and too circular to accurately describe what it proscribed.

Such unfocused reactions to alleged propaganda messages are part of a larger issue of definitional creep. Like the words “ideology,” “myth,” and “text” before it, “propaganda” has become a contested term which has so many meanings that it has ended up with almost no meaning at all. The only feature of propaganda with which most partisans appear to agree is that it is a detestable practice that neither they nor anyone on their side would use.

Unfortunately, academics have not always clarified the matter very effectively. Scholarly treatments of propaganda, while usually more rigorous than the definition used within the Stop Government Propaganda Act, present a host of possible meanings. Hugh Rank, for example, argues for the existence of “a propaganda blitz unparalleled in human history,” which he seems to view as advertising and commercials.<sup>14</sup> J. Fred MacDonald suggests that propaganda “is little more than the principal methodology of persuasion operative in a society that is technological, urban, and populous.”<sup>15</sup> Nicholas F. S. Burnett prefers the simpler (and broader) “discourse in the service of ideology,”<sup>16</sup> while Clayton Laurie seems to view propaganda as the equivalent of persuasive discourse.<sup>17</sup> Finally, in his classic treatise on propaganda, Jacques Ellul offers an almost mystical, ubiquitous approach, arguing that propaganda is “woven into the very fabric of society,” making it virtually inseparable from the concept of information.<sup>18</sup>

Clearly, scholars have viewed propaganda in a number of ways. Probably the best that one can glean from such a variety of approaches is to obtain a rough consensus which suggests that propaganda generally possesses three contextual characteristics: institutionality, mass distribution, and multiple iterations. First, propaganda typically emerges from an institutional source. Whether from a government entity, a religious organization, or a corporation, propaganda tends to be far more top-down than it is bottom-up. Second, such sources normally disseminate propaganda to a mass audience. In the modern age, propagandists have accomplished this dissemination through both low-tech means (e.g., posters) and high-tech means (e.g., the internet). Third, propaganda usually appears in the form of multiple messages or even a campaign. Institutional sources typically have the sort of resources that can support a series of messages, including the use of strategists who orchestrate the mechanics of a propaganda campaign over time.

These contextual characteristics initially might appear to be useful in that they seem to eliminate at least some instances of communication from the propaganda scholar’s area of interest. The writings of the Unabomber, for example—as the apparent work of an isolated individual—may be propagandistic, but they are probably not propaganda. Similarly, memoranda and other forms of internal communication within a presidential administration are probably not propaganda. Although they emerge from an institutional source and may take the form of successive sets of messages, they do not typically reach a mass audience.

Yet these three contextual markers still leave distracting gray areas. Consider, for instance, the series of statements on Pope John Paul II’s increasingly feeble health disseminated by the Vatican in early 2005. The source was obviously an institution, and its messages reached an international mass audience. Moreover, since the

messages were in the form of a series of public statements, they technically met the third contextual characteristic. But is it really useful to view informational messages about the Pope's health as propaganda? Similarly, consider the outrageous but popular Quiznos Subs television commercials. With quirky storylines involving singing rodents and a chef so focused on his work that he forgets to wear pants, the spots are now a fixture of Super Bowl advertising. As a mass-mediated corporate campaign, these ads might—at least contextually—be considered propaganda. Yet frivolous spots featuring singing animals and a partially clothed Chef Jimmy seem a far cry from the image of propaganda as a base and deceitful form of mass communication.<sup>19</sup>

As this confusion suggests, scholars have yet to find a way to define propaganda consistently or to differentiate it from other forms of communication, such as public relations and advertising. This review is intended to bring some clarity to what is admittedly a clouded area of scholarship by sketching the beginnings of a more useful theoretical version of propaganda as it functions in praxis. If one accepts that propaganda normally features the contextual characteristics of institutional source, mass dissemination, and multiple messages, one is still left with the multiplicity—and definitional futility—of the diverse approaches already noted. What I propose, instead, is that these contextual characteristics create a theoretical container and that within this container—the thing contained, to paraphrase Burke<sup>20</sup>—are innumerable historical messages which present critics with the opportunity to study propaganda as it functions. The goal of such study would be to move beyond propaganda's overly vague contextual markers to begin an inductive reconstruction of its operational features as a rhetorical practice.<sup>21</sup>

To do so, it is important from the outset to distinguish between international and domestic propaganda. At least in the context of war, messages aimed at enemy states and people would seem to have a set of distinct *prima facie* functions, including reduction of the enemy's morale, encouragement of surrender or desertion, and the sowing of confusion.<sup>22</sup> Domestic propaganda, in contrast, targets a different audience for very different reasons. Both kinds of propaganda have proven difficult to capture conceptually, and thus need more scholarly scrutiny. Because they diverge in significant ways, however, this essay focuses only on the reconceptualization of domestic propaganda.

The four books under review present an intriguing way to begin this reconceptualization. Here are four scholars who explore domestic propaganda from the ground up, using the historical contexts of World War II and the Cold War as case studies. Christina S. Jarvis's *The Male Body at War* is a detailed exploration of America's perception of its embodied self before and after Pearl Harbor. Gerd Horten's detailed and cogent book *Radio Goes to War* offers a rich perspective on the war's aural propaganda as broadcast to the American public over the radio. Shawn J. Parry-Giles's *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945–1955* brings the reader forward in time, focusing on the propaganda efforts of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.<sup>23</sup> And, finally, Randall L. Bytwerk's *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic* offers a

stimulating examination of the domestic propaganda of the Third Reich before and during World War II and of East Germany (the GDR) during the Cold War.

Each of these works offers various ways of understanding propaganda, but, when considered holistically, they encourage an inductive approach to this communication form and its function. Rather than describing propaganda contextually or ontologically, in other words, these books together provide a narrower conception based on examples of propaganda in praxis. This approach, I argue, makes the contribution of this literature significant. Specifically, while these inductive explorations offer several possible insights into domestic propaganda as a form of symbolic action, the focus in this essay is to suggest that one of domestic propaganda's key features in practice is its characteristic agonism.

To gain some perspective on this argument, it may be useful to examine briefly the historical circumstances during which the word "propaganda" originally emerged. As many theorists have noted, the term "propaganda" was a product of the 17th-century Catholic Church. Established by order of Pope Gregory XV in 1622, the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* was created specifically "as a means of countering the Protestant revolution" personified by Martin Luther and his cohorts.<sup>24</sup> The bitter nature of this struggle between Reformation and Counter-Reformation was evident in the mission of the new organization, which aimed in part "to reconquer by spiritual arms" those areas "lost to the Church in the debacle of the sixteenth century."<sup>25</sup>

From its very first days, then, propaganda embraced the concept of a struggle between two daunting combatants. The Church's perspective was in some ways reminiscent of the ancient contrast between internal temptations as "a formidable enemy force" and of the individual "as a vigilant adversary who confronts them, struggles against them, and tries to subdue them."<sup>26</sup> Michel Foucault suggests that in later Christian thought such interior evils eventually became exterior ones, personified in the form of the Other.<sup>27</sup> As manifested in both sides of the Counter-Reformation, this agonistic struggle—pitting protagonist against antagonist—gradually emerged as a battle in which propaganda itself became the primary weapon, used both to bolster one's own forces and to demoralize the external opposition. Before long, as Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell explain, "all major conflicts in society, whether religious or territorial, provided an opportunity for the contesting forces to use whatever techniques they could find for disseminating propagandistic information."<sup>28</sup>

Although several centuries have passed since the term "propaganda" first appeared, the contemporary world continues to see various entities in conflict using words and images as weapons in high-stakes contests. For this reason, the central argument of this essay is that a primary animating force in domestic propaganda is still its agonism. In the balance of this essay, I shall elaborate on this thesis, contending that propaganda's agonistic nature emerges from two metaphoric tasks. Specifically, I argue that domestic propaganda in praxis: (1) constructs an internal protagonist; and (2) constructs an external antagonist.

### Constructing a Protagonist

Edwin Black argues that persuasive discourse inevitably displays an image of its ideal audience. Calling this phenomenon the “second persona,” Black’s point is that while discourse often betrays much about its producer, it also tells a great deal about the precise audience intended for the message.<sup>29</sup> Maurice Charland’s work on the *Peuple Québécois* adds to Black’s insight by demonstrating that such inchoate discursive images can in effect call an audience into being. Here, the producer’s recipients come to understand the qualities the rhetoric requires of them and are thus constituted in the very act of understanding the discourse.<sup>30</sup>

One of domestic propaganda’s most important tasks works in a very similar way. It is the nature of internal propaganda to suggest to audiences that they are imbued with heroic qualities and noble ideals. To do so, propaganda messages construct a mass protagonist. Specific audience members, while they of course literally retain their individual identity at a physical level, symbolically become one aspect of a much larger, embodied whole. The propaganda thus invites its recipients to understand themselves as a vital element of the personified state.

This conceptual operation is metaphorical in nature, loosely following the logic of the synecdochal metaphor STATES are PERSONS.<sup>31</sup> Jarvis’s *Male Body at War* suggests that this process is most intelligible in the concept of the body politic, where the idea of a nation becomes not only personified but embodied such that it becomes an agent with nearly human qualities.<sup>32</sup> One of the most important aspects of this metaphoric national being is its leadership, which serves as a sort of cognitive face for the body politic.

Jarvis offers two compelling illustrations of the way domestic propaganda on the American home front in World War II constructed its leaders—both mythical and literal—as such a face. First, she demonstrates that as America’s entry into the war neared, the popular image of Uncle Sam changed, becoming muscular and more menacing in appearance. She cites the 1940 poster “Defend Your Country,” which shows an Uncle Sam

ready to take action. He has thrown off his coat and hat and has rolled up his shirtsleeves; his open stance, unbuttoned shirt, and clenched fist indicate that he is ready to fight. The screaming eagle behind him reinforces his bellicosity; his muscular forearms let the viewer know that his blows will be hard.

This Uncle Sam, she concludes, “will not just call Americans to duty; he will take part in the war himself.”<sup>33</sup> As a popular representation of the nation, this image and similar ones during the war period indicated a dramatically stronger national self-conception, particularly in light of the preceding Depression.

Popular images of President Franklin D. Roosevelt also featured a surprisingly strong body. In part, this image was a clever deception, abetted by White House journalists during both the Depression and the later war. As Jarvis explains, “throughout the depression and most of World War II, the press used carefully staged photographs to assure a first crippled, then warring nation that Roosevelt, their head of state, embodied the strength, health, and physical ability necessary to

guide the country.”<sup>34</sup> In the malleable world of editorial cartoons, Jarvis shows how the president’s body became even more robust, even athletic. Much like the depiction of Uncle Sam, the administration and press helped transform the image of Roosevelt from a crippled, sick man into one of active health.

As a vital cognitive face for the body politic during the war, Roosevelt’s popular image was important in other forms of domestic propaganda as well. Horten’s *Radio Goes to War* shows how Roosevelt received special attention from radio programmers, such as when writer William N. Robson used the popular series *This is War!* to emphasize “FDR’s leadership qualities and the similarities between FDR and the great presidents George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.” The program, as Horten points out, was careful to observe that now “there was another great president in the White House, one hardened by his own debilitating illness and miraculous recovery.”<sup>35</sup> Serving as cognitive faces for the body politic in a variety of messages, both Uncle Sam and Roosevelt thus found themselves representing the nation’s perceptions of its increasing strength and resolve on the home front.

Such a phenomenon is, of course, not limited to the United States. As Bytwerk’s *Bending Spines* shows, both Hitler and, in later years, the leaders of East Germany found ways to use propaganda to construct themselves as powerful and formidable faces of the German body politic. In Hitler’s case, Nazi propaganda repeatedly mythologized him as the embodiment of the nation. Bytwerk demonstrates that this veneration sometimes reached levels of deification, as when “the sacredness of Hitler’s words was emphasized in a widely distributed picture titled ‘In the Beginning Was the Word,’ not an accidental quotation of the opening words of the Gospel of John.”<sup>36</sup> Later, even as the GDR was emerging from the war’s ashes, the occupying Soviets distributed a book that venerated Stalin, presenting him “as a flawless, almost superhuman figure.”<sup>37</sup> In this way, both German regimes used propaganda much like their American counterparts, crafting the symbolic leadership of the body politic—its public face—as a formidable symbol, suggesting to the public the strength and power of the constructed protagonist.

Yet while the face of the body politic is obviously important to propaganda, a wider element in the metaphoric creation of a protagonist is the more anonymous guise of the people themselves. By creating a positive persona onto which its recipients can map themselves cognitively, domestic propaganda gives audiences a more immediate way to identify with the mass protagonist. The Nazis accomplished this goal, writes Jarvis, in their strictly regulated public art, which endeavored to create an image of the German nation embodied as “a new, mechanized man—the ultimate man of steel.”<sup>38</sup> On the other side of the Atlantic, American propagandists realized this point as well. In a 1943 advertisement for Florida Grapefruit Juice, for example, Jarvis points to the construction of tough and ready American soldiers: “How well every Jap knows the truth today . . . for he’s up against men with iron wills and nerves of steel—and bodies hard as nails.”<sup>39</sup> While such appeals portrayed American soldiers, Jarvis concludes that “the real audience for these images was American citizens on the home front.”<sup>40</sup> These depictions, in other words, allowed the domestic audience to identify with the soldiers in the ad and ultimately to place themselves in the

protagonist's tough skin. Although the advertisement's viewers remained at home and their physical bodies remained the same, the imagery in the ad provided a means for those on the home front to become symbolically the national protagonist, complete with a honed and combat-ready physique.

Horten argues that radio shows on the home front were able to accomplish this level of identification more literally by allowing listeners to imagine themselves as actually fighting on the battlefield. The radio show *The Man Behind the Gun*, for instance, would "place listeners in the middle of the action by directly involving them" in the fight:

You're sitting there, with the earphones digging into your skull, waiting and listening . . . listening for the sound of a circuit key being opened somewhere in the thousands of miles of sky all around you . . . waiting for the sound of static . . . the sound of the scouting force calling you.<sup>41</sup>

Here the construction of the embodied protagonist took a personal turn, as propagandists encouraged direct audience participation in the body politic.

With the state's leaders and its people caught up in the embodied national image, the domestic propagandist completes the task of constructing a protagonist by venerating the national collective, instilling it with positive, heroic qualities. In Germany, both the Nazis and the GDR presented "totalitarianism . . . as a force for all that was right and true. . . . It was," concludes Bytwerk, "rather easy for citizens to believe their governments were pursuing noble aims, especially since propaganda ceaselessly said so."<sup>42</sup> On the American side, the veneration of the body politic and its elements was constant. For instance, the radio show *This is War!* stressed American nobility in its reluctance to enter the conflict, since "we were busy educating our people, giving them a decent slant on things, trying to see that the hungry got fed and the jobless got work, trying to remember the forgotten man, trying to deal out a better deal around the table."<sup>43</sup> The Cold War featured similar veneration, such as Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" campaign in the summer of 1953, which, according to Parry-Giles in *Rhetorical Presidency*, "portrayed the United States as the scientific superpower of peace, which could best supervise all atomic research."<sup>44</sup> Combined with the transformation of both leaders and people as embodied in the national image, such laudatory messages became a way to construct the perfect protagonist as a heroic, even noble character with whom its constituents could viscerally identify.

From Black's perspective, then, domestic propaganda's initial task—constructing a protagonist—is a manifestation of the second persona. Described effectively by Jarvis as a national body politic, this concept is the product of a metaphoric process in which isolated individuals are invited to see themselves as adopting the characteristics of a formidable, venerated group. This embodiment has both a brave face—its empowered leaders—and a means for civilians to directly identify with the collective. It is, then, a form of constitutive rhetoric, one that functions normatively to prescribe conceptual and actual behavior.<sup>45</sup> As the next section contends, however, the second

task of a domestic propagandist is anti-normative in that propaganda proscribes conceptual and actual behavior.

### Constructing Antagonists

Philip Wander has built on Black's concept of the second persona by proposing that messages do not stop at implying their ideal audience. They also portray, he argues, a third persona, with those qualities or ideals that rhetors want their audience to avoid. As he suggests:

[J]ust as the discourse may be understood to affirm certain characteristics, it may also be understood to imply other characteristics, roles, actions, or ways of seeing things to be avoided. . . . [This is] the "it" that is not present, that is objectified in a way that "you" and "I" are not.<sup>46</sup>

Domestic propaganda appears to accomplish a similar task in its messages. Just as propagandists construct an ideal protagonist with whom recipients can identify as a body politic, so, too, they construct an antagonist against which the embodied public should act. This constructed antagonist can become, according to Wander:

quite alien, a being equated with disease, a "cancer" called upon to disfigure an individual or a group; or an animal subordinated through furtive glance or beady eye; or an organism, as a people might be transformed, through a biological metaphor, into "parasites."<sup>47</sup>

The process of constructing such repugnant antagonists appears to work both metaphorically and antithetically. First, as with the construction of its protagonists, domestic propaganda's creation of an antagonist performs a metaphoric operation. In political affairs antagonists are, of course, literally human. Yet propaganda reconstructs these humans into some form of a threatening entity. Audiences come to understand what initially appeared to be human through the lens of another domain, one assigned by the propagandist. In this manner a nation and its people can become transformed into the very antithesis of the protagonist.

The metaphoric construction of an Other in domestic propaganda usually takes the form of either demonization or dehumanization.<sup>48</sup> Demonization is the construction of an antagonist who is rational and who "is typically personified as a devil playing poker, chess, or some other game with rules."<sup>49</sup> From the American side of the Cold War, propagandists constructed the Soviet Union as just such an antagonist. In *Rhetorical Presidency*, for example, Parry-Giles investigates the propaganda messages of the early 1950s *Voice of America*, in which "the Soviet Union, of course, served as the evil instigator of the Cold War."<sup>50</sup> Such declarations abroad were echoed by public messages back home, not only in President Truman's "own public discourse,"<sup>51</sup> but in declarations like that of Representative Walter H. Judd, who argued in 1947 that "Russia herself is forcing on all her neighbors as cruel and ruthless and utterly despotic an imperialism as any the world has ever known."<sup>52</sup> Although the Soviets became a potent antagonist in such rhetoric, they appeared to maintain a level of subjectivity and even a semblance of their humanity.

On the other side of the iron curtain, East German propagandists constructed the West in a similar fashion. As Bytwerk explains, “Capitalism played the role of the devil in Marxism-Leninism.”<sup>53</sup> Its literature, he continues, “is filled with attacks on capitalism that put the battle between systems in the form of the struggle between good and evil.”<sup>54</sup> On the eve of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, for instance, Communist agitators were instructed to describe the West as “the much-praised ‘Free World,’ which uses gangster methods to mislead people or forces them with criminal means to betray their homeland and fall into misery.”<sup>55</sup> Much like the domestic propaganda of their adversaries in the West, here was a demonizing construction, the creation of an antagonist who was undeniably evil, but who retained a modicum of rationality.

During World War II, in contrast, both sides appeared to construct a dehumanized antagonist, one who had no rationality or subjectivity, but who instead took the form of “savage creatures or monsters.”<sup>56</sup> The Nazis, of course, created the Jewish people as exactly this sort of enemy, seeing a nefarious Jewish conspiracy both domestically and in the Allied leadership. Bytwerk points out that for those in the Third Reich:

[T]he Jews were not simply inferior (as were, for example, blacks in Nazi ideology); they were the embodiment of evil, the antipole to the Aryan German. As Hitler had put it in *Mein Kampf*: “By warding off the Jews I am doing the Lord’s work.”<sup>57</sup>

For the Nazis, in other words, the Jewish antagonist was not even a worthy opponent; it was worthy only of extermination.

America’s domestic propaganda during the same war constructed the Japanese people as a similar enemy, one dehumanized into an irrational creature or infestation lacking both subjectivity and rationality. This metaphoric operation was very apparent in one episode of the hit radio show *Treasury Star Parade*, which asked listeners:

Have you ever watched a well-trained monkey at the zoo? . . . Now consider the imitative little Japanese . . . who for seventy-five years has built himself into something so closely resembling a civilized human being that he actually believes he is just that.”<sup>58</sup>

But in American propaganda, to be sure, the Japanese enemy was rarely human at all. As Jarvis notes, “throughout the war, the Japanese were frequently portrayed in a variety of subhuman or animalistic forms; they appeared as monkeys, gorillas, rats, mice, bees, lice, snakes, dogs, mosquitoes, cockroaches, and other vermin.”<sup>59</sup> Much like the Nazi’s view of the Jewish Other, here was a vile, dehumanized enemy indeed.<sup>60</sup>

While the construction of these kinds of antagonists functions metaphorically, it also has an antithetical function. If constructing a protagonist helps to create the body politic through identification, constructing an antagonist helps to create the body politic through negation. “In short,” confirms James Jasinski, “‘we’ gain our sense of self through opposition; we ‘know’ who we are because ‘we’re not like them.’”<sup>61</sup> By crafting an antagonist, then, propagandists define the boundaries of acceptable being on the home front even as they direct domestic antipathy outward.

The key feature of the antagonist's negating function is to draw sharp contrasts. Domestic propagandists first construct the enemy metaphorically then rhetorically oppose antagonist and protagonist, pitting them against each other in a form of verbal struggle. This direct antithesis defines both sides even as it depicts them in conflict. As Bytwerk suggests, the Nazis understood this principle quite well, believing that "just as a soap manufacturer claims its product is the best, so, too, a political propagandist must admit no virtue on the opposing side. The masses understand black and white, not shades of gray."<sup>62</sup>

This antithetical contrast appeared quite clearly on both sides of the Cold War. Bytwerk reports that behind the iron curtain a great deal of Marxist propaganda was aimed, in part, at adding to "the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist world view the socialist convictions and behaviors that will lead the workers to . . . firm class positions in the battle against the enemies of peace and socialism."<sup>63</sup> Such messages, concludes Bytwerk, ultimately insisted that "the eventual triumph of socialism depended on the complete elimination of capitalism."<sup>64</sup> Not to be outdone, American cold warriors drew a sharp contrast between themselves and the communist antagonist. In the matter of using propaganda itself, for instance, Parry-Giles shows how American rhetors

cultivated a postwar view of the Soviet government and called for a U.S. response to the Soviets' propaganda offensive. The Soviet government, they argued, launched a new kind of war—a "war of words"—that threatened the U.S. government and the future of democracy.<sup>65</sup>

The *New York Times* later used this "binary construction of propaganda, equating U.S. propaganda with telling the 'truth about the United States' and the Russian program with disseminating a 'storm of lies.'"<sup>66</sup> Thus, each side of the Cold War crafted its antagonist in such a way that it presented a dramatic contrast to the propagandist's own side.

Comparable agonistic contrasts also emerged from the domestic propaganda of World War II. For their part, the Nazis produced propaganda which suggested that "this [is] a war for our very survival. He who does not want our victory wants our defeat. He who wants our defeat wants our death."<sup>67</sup> Horten illustrates how, on the American home front, similar polarizing appeals were ubiquitous, as evidenced by the fourth episode of the radio show *You Can't Do Business With Hitler*: "We are now at war. There are but two alternatives: total victory or total defeat. There can be no such thing as a military stalemate that would result in the survival of Hitlerism."<sup>68</sup> A related message appeared in Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* films, where "totalitarian ideology and Allied ideals were depicted as completely irreconcilable opposites: they showed the striking differences between democracy and dictatorship, freedom and slavery, tolerance and bigotry, light and dark."<sup>69</sup> Thus, because the war was "framed in binary and often more realistic terms," concludes Jarvis, "World War II was presented as a fierce battle of competing nationalisms and ideologies, which pitted the U.S. and democracy against the Axis powers and fascism."<sup>70</sup>

Evidently, then, domestic propaganda's sharp contrast between protagonist and antagonist presents an antithetical view of the world to its domestic audience. By showing their constituents images of a demonized or dehumanized Other, then directly contrasting that image with depictions of the protagonist's noble and venerated body politic, propagandists define both appropriate mind sets and appropriate norms on the home front. The two tasks of domestic propaganda, in other words, work together by inviting the audience to become part of the protagonist's image and simultaneously inviting them to repudiate the antagonist's image. Importantly, while Wander suggests that the third persona is typically an implied aspect of a given discourse, in domestic propaganda the construction of an antagonist appears to be unusually visible. Thus, as a constitutive, normative variety of rhetoric, domestic propaganda is clearly not a subtle operation.

### **Conclusion**

Work in rhetorical scholarship has occasionally prized the tenets and ideals of what some call a feminine style of rhetoric.<sup>71</sup> In its most fully realized ideation, "invitational rhetoric," this perspective aims "to provide the basis for the creation and maintenance of relationships of equality."<sup>72</sup> With values such as immanent worth, freedom of choice, and personal safety, this rhetorical style certainly appears to be a healthy approach to human interaction. Indeed, in some cases feminine styles of rhetoric might serve as a key in helping to heal the verbal wounds of war.<sup>73</sup> The same scholarship occasionally condemns the more traditional masculine style of rhetoric, and sometimes implies that scholars should pay less attention to it.<sup>74</sup> Certainly, if one thinks of the masculine style of rhetoric as discourse that establishes and exploits hierarchies in an attempt to dominate others, there are ample reasons for its condemnation.<sup>75</sup> But to take our attention away from such potentially malignant rhetoric may well be a dangerous proposition. Such discourse, distasteful as it is, cries out for more, not less, scrutiny from concerned critics.

Domestic propaganda is perhaps the ultimate example of this masculine style of rhetoric. Peter Odegard—an academic who became the primary architect of the U.S. Treasury Department's massive war bond campaign in World War II—candidly described propaganda as "the engineering of consent."<sup>76</sup> Odegard and co-author E. Allen Helms argued that potent propaganda appeals to "the aspirations, fears and loyalties" of its audience, even as it makes "every effort to Satanize the opposition." The most effective propaganda, they concluded, focuses on "hyperbole and invective."<sup>77</sup> It is exactly this sort of unpleasant discourse that emerges most clearly from the four books under review. Although the books examine different propagandists, different time periods, and different channels of propaganda, what is remarkable about them collectively is the agonistic nature of the messages they hold up for examination. Each presents an unflattering view of domestic propaganda as it works in praxis, in specific, real-world situations. And, finally, each implies the dangerous nature of those elites who see public opinion as nothing more than the "engineering of consent."<sup>78</sup>

While this central idea is evident in various places in each of the books under review, I must emphasize that each of the works possesses its own unique strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, each is worthy of reading on its own merits. Jarvis's *Male Body at War* is particularly impressive in demonstrating the visceral power of propaganda's personification, whereby the citizens of a nation can find themselves wrapped up in a national body politic that acts in particular ways. Still, although *Male Body at War* justifiably focuses on the nation's growing sense of itself as masculine before and during the war years, Jarvis sometimes appears to hurry past questions of femininity during the war effort. As the book acknowledges, the masculinization of the nation "did not entail eschewing images of women."<sup>79</sup> Yet such female images do not play a major role in Jarvis's account of the war's propaganda. That such images—as Jarvis argues—largely contributed to the ongoing masculinization of the country is a credible argument. A full exploration of this argument and its implications, however, awaits more scholarly attention.

Horten's *Radio Goes to War* also presents an effective analysis of World War II's domestic propaganda, successfully depicting the radio propagandists who used this powerful forum to explain the nation's war aims to the public and, thereby, venerated the American role in the conflict. What is particularly striking about Horten's account is his ability to explain how such domestic propaganda became increasingly decentralized during the war years, even as government involvement in official propaganda declined. His portrait of the War Advertising Council—still in operation today as the Ad Council—creates a disturbing image of Madison Avenue executives creating innumerable propaganda messages on behalf of the government, all the while scheming to advance the cause of advertising in the postwar years. Ironically, this powerful account is also one of the book's limitations. There is no doubt that the War Advertising Council was a potent force during World War II. Yet Horten's tight focus on the advertising industry overlooks the government agencies that remained in the propaganda business up to and beyond the war's end, especially the U.S. Treasury in its tremendous war bond drives.<sup>80</sup> While domestic propaganda often originated in Madison Avenue offices, the government usually retained creative control over the ensuing messages. The result was a sort of hybrid propaganda, the product of both private and public efforts. Horten's work, then, begins a worthy and important examination of this rich material, but, even so, more work remains before we will really understand the nature of these efforts.

Parry-Giles's *Rhetorical Presidency* presents another detailed examination of domestic American propaganda, this time with a focus on the Cold War. The book's clear strength is in its archival research, often relying on recently declassified material to interpret the actions of the cold warriors. Using this wealth of primary material, Parry-Giles traces the public and, frequently, internal debates over the use of propaganda within the United States. While her focus is often more on administrative or congressional deliberations than on the content of propaganda messages per se, the book offers several useful glimpses into the products of the Cold War propaganda apparatus as established by Truman and refined by Eisenhower. Significantly, Parry-Giles argues in part that perceptions of propaganda efforts during both presidential

administrations evolved from a “journalistic paradigm” to a “militarized propaganda structure.”<sup>81</sup> Yet a militarized conception of propaganda often seems to emerge even in the earlier journalistic stage, as in such contemporary phrases as a “war of words” and calls to use “the radio, the newspaper, and . . . psychological warfare” in the growing Cold War.<sup>82</sup> While such references appear to weaken Parry-Giles’s depiction of propaganda’s Cold War stages to a degree, they ultimately bolster her primary argument that perception of propaganda in the United States gradually became more militarized as the Cold War progressed. Still, further study may help to refine the dynamics of this progression and continue to add to our understanding of this vital era of propaganda production.

Finally, Bytwerk’s *Bending Spines*—in its exploration of the World War II propaganda produced by the Nazis and the Cold War propaganda produced by the GDR—offers an excellent complement to the U.S. perspective on both conflicts presented, variously, in Jarvis, Horten, and Parry-Giles. Using a wide range of documents from German archives, Bytwerk makes compelling, bold arguments in comparing and contrasting the propaganda efforts of the two totalitarian regimes. Most interesting, perhaps, is his use of a religious metaphor, with the Nazi and GDR states as secular churches and their propagandists as ubiquitous evangelists. Unfortunately, this metaphor sometimes appears to be limited in its usefulness. Short explorations of the German political cabaret and various satirical publications, for instance, seem a far cry from evangelical practice—and Bytwerk wisely drops much of the religious metaphor in such sections.<sup>83</sup> Yet while the book’s central metaphor may stretch at times, it is ultimately a useful way in which to understand many of the messages under study, especially since Bytwerk provides such a rich tapestry of supporting material. The book thus provides scholars with an excellent introduction to the minutiae of Nazi and GDR propaganda and could well serve as a springboard for a host of other studies on the subject.

All four of these books, then, are worthy of individual examination. Each makes unique arguments and produces important insights on the propaganda it scrutinizes. Yet when considered together the books provide an important window into the mechanics of domestic propaganda. They establish that recognizing propaganda is much more than looking at contextual markers. Instead, a deeper understanding of domestic propaganda is possible only when one examines it inductively, as it was produced and disseminated. Such an examination, as I have suggested, inevitably must conclude that, as a form of rhetorical action, domestic propaganda is both unfortunate and troubling.

Ironically, the true effectiveness of domestic propaganda is open to debate. As Horten suggests, “the media research conducted during World War II, as well as common sense, reminds us to be cautious about taking the effects of propaganda for granted.”<sup>84</sup> Indeed, one must admit that there is little or no scientific proof that the domestic propaganda discussed in this essay had any true effects on its target audiences. However, domestic propaganda that constructs both protagonist and antagonist is at the very least an invitation, one that suggests to its audience that its way of viewing the world is at once rational and logical. To the degree that such

messages depict a compelling agonistic world to an audience in crisis—a war, a depression, a disaster—they cry out for critical scrutiny.

Importantly, while propaganda studies remains an interdisciplinary project, rhetorical and public address scholars have much to bring to the critical table. As researchers trained to investigate the interplay of both text and context, such scholars are equipped far better than many in other disciplines to grapple with propaganda in action. For instance, Parry-Giles and Bytwerk—both communication scholars—demonstrate quite effectively that an archival investigation into the behind-the-scenes creation of a propaganda message is a potent means of producing useful insights about that message and its ultimate public appearance. Their books—even as they contribute significantly to the larger field of propaganda studies—thus indicate the kind of contributions that rhetorical and public address scholars can make to this interdisciplinary area. In the end, then, if it is indeed true that propaganda is increasingly everywhere, such contributions from communication-based scholars will become more and more important as we struggle to understand what propagandists do when they attempt to produce “the engineering of consent.”<sup>85</sup>

## Notes

- [1] Jean Anouilh, *The Lark*, adapted by Lillian Hellman (New York: Random House, 1956), 20.
- [2] Jonathan Foreman, “Moore’s the Pity: Fahrenheit’s Fictions,” *New York Post*, June 23, 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [3] Andrea Peyser, “A Sorry Apology at CBS,” *New York Post*, September 21, 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [4] Martin L. Gross, “Why Bush Will Win,” *The Washington Times*, October 28, 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [5] *Augusta Chronicle*, “‘Passion’ Misrepresents Jews,” March 6, 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [6] Michael Tomasky, “Long Division: America is Not Split Over the Vietnam War, But Karl Rove Needs You to Believe That It Is,” *The American Prospect*, October, 2004, p. 18, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [7] *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, “A Scurrilous Ad: Attack on Kerry’s War Record Reaches a New Low,” August 13, 2004, sooner edition, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [8] *St. Petersburg Times*, “Bush’s Propaganda Spiral,” January 27, 2005, South Pinellas edition, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [9] *Denver Post*, “Unethical Deal Ends Column, Credibility,” January 11, 2005, final edition, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [10] *The Oregonian*, “Tax-Paid Propaganda,” January 19, 2005, sunrise edition, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
- [11] Brian Orloff, “Senators to Introduce ‘Stop Government Propaganda Act,’” *Editor and Publisher*, January 27, 2005, [http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/search/article\\_display.jsp?vnu\\_content\\_id=1000778976](http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000778976).
- [12] Ibid.
- [13] Ibid.
- [14] Hugh Rank, “Teaching About Public Persuasion: Rationale and a Schema,” in *Teaching About Doublespeak*, ed. Daniel Dieterich (Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1976), 5.

- [15] J. Fred MacDonald, "Propaganda and Order in Modern Society," in *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective*, ed. Ted J. Smith III (New York: Praeger, 1989), 24.
- [16] Nicholas F. S. Burnett, "Ideology and Propaganda: Toward an Integrative Approach," in Smith, *Pluralistic Perspective*, 127.
- [17] Clayton D. Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 6.
- [18] Stanley B. Cunningham, "Smoke and Mirrors: A Confirmation of Jacques Ellul's Theory of Information Use in Propaganda," in Smith, *Pluralistic Perspective*, 151.
- [19] See *Brandweek*, "Chain Proudly Says It's 'Toast,'" November 29, 2004, 16–17.
- [20] Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 25.
- [21] Here I am borrowing somewhat from Carolyn R. Miller's argument that one can best understand rhetorical genres as "based in rhetorical practice and . . . organized around situated actions (that is, pragmatic, rather than syntactic or semantic)." See her "Genre as Social Action," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 155.
- [22] Another kind of international propaganda would obviously be that aimed at foreign allies.
- [23] Some readers may care to know that Parry-Giles directed my dissertation in 2001, and so the ideas on propaganda in her book are in some respects consonant with my own.
- [24] Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 72–73.
- [25] Peter Guilday, "The Sacred Congregation De Propaganda Fide," *Catholic Historical Review* 6 (1921): 480. See further discussion in Robert Jackall, "Introduction," in *Propaganda*, ed. Robert Jackall (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 1–2.
- [26] Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure, Vol. 2: The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 66.
- [27] *Ibid.*, 68.
- [28] Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 73.
- [29] Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56 (1970): 109–19.
- [30] Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Quebecois*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 133–50.
- [31] See George Lakoff, "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf," *Peace Research* 23 (1991): 25–32.
- [32] Christina S. Jarvis, *The Male Body at War: American Masculinity During World War II* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois Press, 2003), 14.
- [33] *Ibid.*, 40.
- [34] *Ibid.*, 31.
- [35] Gerd Horten, *Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda During World War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 47.
- [36] Randall L. Bytwerk, *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 18.
- [37] *Ibid.*, 22. While later GDR propaganda did not deify its leadership, it did present leaders in highly honored terms, and never revealed their mistakes. See Bytwerk, 28–29.
- [38] Jarvis, *Male Body at War*, 44.
- [39] *Ibid.*, 48, ellipsis in original ad.
- [40] *Ibid.*, 50.
- [41] Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 53. Horten quotes the show's text from Ranald R. MacDougall, "Documentaries for Civilians: The Man Behind the Man Behind the Gun," in *Off Mike: Radio Writing by the Nation's Top Radio Writers*, ed. Jerome Lawrence (New York: Essential Books, 1944), 155.
- [42] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 40. See also Bytwerk, 24, for his description of Helmut Stellrecht's *Faith and Action*, a Nazi "book of virtues," with "chapters on faith, loyalty, bravery, obedience, blood, life, and death." As Bytwerk concludes, with this and other widespread

- Nazi publications, “a German who did not think too hard or look too deeply could comfortably believe that Nazism stood firmly on the side of familiar virtues.”
- [43] Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 47. Horten quotes Norman Corwin, *This is War! A Collection of Plays About America on the March* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1942), 8.
- [44] Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945–1955* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 162. In his 1953 “Chance for Peace” address, Eisenhower contended that “the United States sought ‘true peace’ in the post-war years.” Meanwhile, overseas, Radio Free Europe not only re-broadcast the speech to much of Eastern Europe, it also sent messages constructing “U.S. peace as ‘total,’ ‘sincere,’ ‘complete,’ ‘true,’ ‘just,’ ‘honest,’ ‘lasting,’ ‘global,’ ‘real,’ and the peace of the ‘future.’” See Parry-Giles, 154–55.
- [45] For background on constitutive rhetoric, see James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of ‘Constitution’ in *The Federalist Papers*,” in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 72–92.
- [46] Philip Wander, “The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory,” *Central States Speech Journal* 35 (1984): 209.
- [47] Ibid.
- [48] Jurgen Link, “Fanatics, Fundamentalists, Lunatics, and Drug Traffickers: The New Southern Enemy Image,” *Cultural Critique* 19 (Fall 1991): 33–53.
- [49] James J. Kimble, *Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds, Morale, and the U.S. Treasury’s Domestic Propaganda Campaign, 1942–1945* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 3.
- [50] Parry-Giles, *Rhetorical Presidency*, 79.
- [51] Ibid.
- [52] Ibid., 15. Parry-Giles is quoting from the *Congressional Record*, 1947, 6554.
- [53] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 35.
- [54] Ibid., 36.
- [55] Ibid., 102. See also Bytwerk’s description, on p. 83, of a 1986 issue of *Neuer Weg* called “State Terrorism—Why and How Is the USA Increasingly Practicing It?” “The article,” writes Bytwerk, “pointed out that the United States was out to dominate the world, that it was suppressing struggles for national liberation, and that it faced increasing opposition.”
- [56] Kimble, *Mobilizing the Home Front*, Chapter 3.
- [57] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 26.
- [58] Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 55. Horten quotes Neal Hopkins, “A Lesson in Japanese,” in *The Treasury Star Parade* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), 358. This condescending image of the Japanese is a clear echo of a popular white criticism, generally following the Civil War, of African-Americans as imitative. See Kirt H. Wilson, “The Racial Politics of Imitation in the Nineteenth Century,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 89 (2003): 89–108.
- [59] Jarvis, *Male Body at War*, 128.
- [60] American constructions of the German enemy, of course, featured demonization and not (for the most part) dehumanization. For example, Horten reports that in early 1942 the first episode of the radio show *This is War!* suggested of Germany that “the enemy is Murder International, Murder Unlimited; quick murder on the spot or slow murder in the concentration camp, murder for listening to the short-wave radio . . . for speaking one’s mind . . . The enemy is a liar also. A gigantic and deliberate and willful liar.” See Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 45, where he quotes the radio show from Corwin, *This is War!*, 11–15.
- [61] James Jasinski, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 412.
- [62] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 45.
- [63] Ibid., 51. Bytwerk quotes *Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch* (Berlin: Dietz, 1967), 369.
- [64] Ibid., 36.
- [65] Parry-Giles, *Rhetorical Presidency*, 15.

- [66] Ibid., 32. Parry-Giles quotes "Victory for the 'Voice,'" *New York Times*, January 18, 1948, 10.
- [67] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 150. Bytwerk quotes "Rucksicht am falschen Platz," *Das Schwarze Korps*, September 2, 1943, 2.
- [68] Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 56.
- [69] Ibid., 54.
- [70] Jarvis, *Male Body at War*, 38.
- [71] See, for example, Bonnie J. Dow and Mari Boor Tonn, "'Feminine Style' and Political Judgment in the Rhetoric of Ann Richards," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 79 (1993): 286–302.
- [72] Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric," *Communication Monographs* 62 (1995): 13.
- [73] James J. Kimble, "Feminine Style and the Rehumanization of the Enemy: Peacemaking Discourse in *Ladies Home Journal*, 1945–1946," *Women and Language* 27 (2004): 62–67.
- [74] See Foss and Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion"; see also Sally Miller Gearhart, "The Womanization of Rhetoric," *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 2 (1979): 195–201.
- [75] See further discussion of the masculine style in Dow and Tonn, "Feminine Style," 288.
- [76] Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, *American Politics: A Study in Political Dynamics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), 545.
- [77] Ibid., 552, 553.
- [78] Ibid., 545.
- [79] Jarvis, *Male Body at War*, 55.
- [80] Kimble, *Mobilizing the Home Front*, especially Chapter 2.
- [81] Parry-Giles, *Rhetorical Presidency*, 6, 49.
- [82] Ibid., 5, 19.
- [83] Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 117–28.
- [84] Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, 64.
- [85] Odegard and Helms, *American Politics*, 545.